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The relationship between time to maturity and
yield on securities is of widespread interest to finan-
cial market participants and observers. The relation-
ship, known as the term structure of interest rates,
provides information about which maturities offer
the highest expected returns to investors and which
provide the lowest expected costs to borrowers.
Plots of the term structure-called yield curves-are
shown in Chart 1 for three money market instru-
ments as of the first trading days of December 1984
and December 1985.
Many researchers have studied the term structure
of Treasury bill (T-bill) yields and found that in-
vestors could expect higher returns, on average, from
investing in longer term T-bills. The finding is in-
consistent with the pure expectations theory of the
term structure, according to which the expected rate
of return should be the same at all maturities. In this
paper we examine whether this conclusion also
applies to the yield curves for private money market
instruments by testing the pure expectations theory
using yields on three such instruments. We cannot
reject the theory for the private money market yield
curves. The results suggest that the pure expecta-
tions theory may be consistent with the behavior of
money market participants in general and that the
Treasury bill market differs in some way from the
private money markets. We demonstrate that the
term structure of T-bill rates may differ from those
of private money market rates because of a unique
characteristic of the T-bill market: only the Treasury
can borrow at the T-bill rate.
IMPLIED FORWARD RATES AND
THE PURE EXPECTATIONS THEORY
In order to discuss the pure expectations theory
of the term structure it is useful to introduce the
concept of implied forward rates. The term structure
of interest rates at any point in time implies a set of
forward interest rates-that is, interest rates on bonds
* Federal National Mortgage Association.
in the future. Suppose R1 is the current yield on a
one-year discount bond and R2 is the current annual-
ized yield on a two-year discount bond. The implied
forward rate on a one-year bond commencing in one
year (F1) is the rate that equates the two-year return
from investing one dollar in the current two-year
bond ([1 + R2]
2) to the return from investing one
dollar in the current one-year bond and reinvesting
the proceeds at the end of one year in a new one-year
bond:
(1 + R2)
2 = (1 + R1)(l + F1).
This expression can be rearranged to give an expres-
sion for the implied forward rate:
F 1 = [(l + R2)
2/(1 + R1)] - 1,
which may be represented by the usual linear approx-
imation:
F 1 = 2R2 - R1.
l
For example, if the rate on one-year bonds is 9 per-
cent and the rate on two-year bonds is 10 percent,
the implied forward rate on one-year bonds one year
from now is (2 X 10) - 9 = 11 percent.
The pure expectations theory of the term structure
states that implied forward rates always equal ex-
pected future rates because bonds of different maturi-
ties can be considered perfect substitutes.
2 Although
some market participants may have preferences for
1 The linear approximation is used throughout the text
to simplify the discussion. The general formula for cal-
culating the implied forward rate, used in the empirical
work, is
F m = [(l + Rn+m)
n+m/(l + Rn)
n]
1/m  - 1,
where
F m = implied forward rate on m-year bonds com-
mencing n-years from now,
Rn+m = spot rate on n+m-year discount bonds,
R n = spot rate on n-year discount bonds.
2 The discussion here is brief. See Van Horne (1984, pp.
104-12) for a more extensive discussion of the pure expec-
tations theory.
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turity are assumed to be sufficiently active in the
market to determine the term structure of interest
rates. As a result, the expected rate of return is the
same for all maturities.
According to the theory, any significant difference
between implied forward and expected future rates
will be quickly eliminated because it offers market
participants profit opportunities. If the implied
forward rate were higher than the expected future
rate, participants who could borrow at the one-year
rate and lend at the two-year rate could lock in a
forward one-year investment at a rate higher than
the expected future one-year rate. For example; if
one-year bonds are trading at 9 percent and two-year
bonds are trading at 10 percent, the implied forward
rate on one-year bonds commencing in one year is 11
percent. If a market participant believes that in one
year the one-year bond rate will be less than 11 per-
cent, say 10.5 percent, he can issue a one-year bond at
9 percent and invest the proceeds in a two-year bond
at 10 percent. If the participant’s expectations are
correct, he can issue a second one-year bond a year
later at a rate of 10.5 percent. The participant profits
because he earns 10 percent on the two-year bond he
invested in and only pays 9.75 percent to borrow
with the two one-year bonds.
The pure expectations theory states that investors
who are willing and able to take advantage of such a
profit opportunity will continue to borrow at the
short-term rate and lend at the long-term rate until
the implied forward rate equals the expected future
rate. As a result, the shape of the yield curve is
determined solely by expectations of future interest
rates. If interest rates are not expected to change,
the yield curve will be flat. If short-term rates are
expected to rise, the yield curve will be upward-
sloping : long-term rates will exceed short-term rates
by just enough to equate the return from investing
in a long-term security to the expected return from
investing in a short-term security and rolling it over
at the expected higher future short-term rate. Con-
versely, if short-term rates are expected to fall, the
yield curve will be downward-sloping.
Alternatively, the term structure may be affected
by factors in addition to expectations of future rates.
For example, expected returns may be higher on
longer term securities in order to compensate the
investor for investing for longer periods. If such is
the case, the yield curve will be more upward-sloping
than predicted by the pure expectations theory, and
implied forward rates will be higher than expected
future rates. Any difference between the implied
forward rate (F) and the expected future rate (R
e)
is referred to as a term premium (P) :
P = F - R
e.
TESTING THE PURE EXPECTATIONS THEORY
WITH MONEY MARKET YIELDS
Since the pure expectations theory states that
implied forward rates equal expected future rates,
one can test the theory by determining whether the
term premium is zero. Unfortunately, expected
future rates are not observable, making it impossible
to calculate the term premium on an instrument at a
specific time. One can, however, estimate the average
term premium over a long period by assuming that
market participants form expectations rationally.
Under the rational expectations hypothesis, realized
future rates equal expected future rates plus a serially
uncorrelated forecast error with mean zero. In other
words, there is no systematic bias in the market’s
forecasts. Any systematic difference between implied
forward and realized future interest rates can there-
fore be attributed to term premiums.
Most studies of the term structure of money market
rates have used T-bill yields because T-bills have
several qualities that make it easier to isolate the
effect of maturity on yield: T-bills are essentially
free of default risk, they are identical in all respects
except maturity, and they are traded in a highly
liquid market. These studies have rejected the joint
hypothesis of rational expectations and the pure ex-
pectations theory because they have found that im-
plied forward T-bill rates have been significantly
higher, on average, than realized future rates.
3 Since
it is unlikely that the market would systematically
overpredict future rates, the difference between im-
plied forward and realized future rates has generally
been attributed to term premiums.
The term premium in T-bill yields, however, may
not be representative of the overall money market.
Chart 1 shows that the T-bill yield curve has at times
shown greater upward slope than the yield curves of
other money market instruments, suggesting that the
term premium in T-bill yields is bigger than those in
the yields on private money market instruments. In
fact, the T-bill yield curve has been steeper than the
yield curve for negotiable bank certificates of deposit
(CDs) on average over the last twenty years. As
3 For example Kessel (1965), Roll (1970), McCulloch
(1975), and Fama (1984).
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1-mo. 3-mo. 6-mo. 1-mo. 3-mo. 6-mo.
Maturity Maturity
Note: Secondary market quotes are as of the first trading days of each month. All rates are on an interest-to-follow basis--i.e.,
as a percentage of actual funds invested. T-bill rates are generally quoted on a bank-discount basis--i.e., as a percentage of
par, rather than of actual funds invested. The formula to convert a bank-discount rate (BD) to an interest-to-follow rate
(ITF) is ITF = (360 • BD)/[360 - (N • BD/100)], where N is days to maturity.
Source: Salomon Brothers, An Analytical Record of Yields and Yield Spreads (New York, 1986).
shown in Table I, the spread between one-month three- and six-month interest rates) and the three-
CD yields and one-month T-bill yields has usually month rate realized three months later.
5 Assuming
exceeded the spread between three-month CD yields rational expectations, any significant difference can
and three-month T-bill yields. In turn the latter be attributed to a term premium. We use only one
spread has usually exceeded that between six-month
CD yields and six-month T-bill yields. The pattern
is persistent: the three-month spread exceeded the
six-month spread in eighteen of the twenty years.
The T-bill yield curve also has generally been more
upward-sloping than the yield curves for commercial
paper and Eurodollar deposits.
4
These observations suggested that one might test
the pure expectations theory using yields on private
money market instruments and compare the results
to those obtained using yields on T-bills. We esti-
mated the average term premiums in the yields on
CDs, Eurodollars, commercial paper, and T-bills
from 1970 through 1985, the full period for which
first day of the month interest rates are available for
all the instruments from Salomon Brothers, An
Analytical Record of Yields and Yield Spreads. For
each instrument, we looked at the average difference
between the implied forward three-month rate com-
mencing in three months (calculated from the current
observation per quarter since more frequent observa-
tions would overlap, introducing serial correlation
into the error terms.
The estimated average term premiums are reported
in Table II. For T-bills the average term premium
is 61 basis points. Since the estimate is significantly
different from zero at the 99 percent confidence level,
the pure expectations theory is strongly rejected for
the T-bill market. The average term premiums for
the private money market instruments, on the other
hand, are much smaller and not significantly different
from zero in a statistical sense. One cannot reject
the pure expectations theory for private money mar-
ket instruments.
Data are also available as far back as 1964 for
T-bills and CDs. Table III shows the average term
premiums for T-bills and CDs from 1964 through
1985. The estimated average term premium for
4 The rate on Eurodollar deposits is the London inter-
bank offered rate.
5 We could not test the theory using one-month interest
rates because they imply forward two- and five-month
rates when combined with three- and six-month rates and
we did not have data on two- and five-month spot rates.
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6-mo. 1 -mo. 3-mo. 6-mo.
5.19 0.67 0.56 0.44
4.73 0.74 0.67 0.49
5.62 0.51 0.45 0.38
7.11 1.18 1.00 0.80
6.73 1.25 1.07 0.93
4.62 0.57 0.62 0.59
4.59 0.51 0.56 0.43
7.47 1.26 1.25 0.84
8.26 2.26 2.26 1.71
6.28 0.50 0.58 0.61
5.39 0.19 0.23 0.23
5.68 0.33 0.30 0.24
7.88 0.79 0.90 0.73
10.59 1.03 0.89 0.85
12.05 1.89 1.30 0.94
14.82 2.01 1.38 0.95
11.71 1.85 1.37 0.86
9.13 0.58 0.27 0.14
10.26 1.12 0.61 0.42
7.96 0.86 0.43 0.29
CD less T-bill
Note: Rates are secondary market quotes on an interest-to-follow basis (see Chart 1).
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
T-bills is 53 basis points and the estimate is statis-
tically significant at the 99 percent confidence level.
The estimated average term premium for CDs is
much smaller and not significantly different from
zero. The pure expectations theory is strongly re-
jected for T-bill yields but not rejected for CD yields.
assumptions the test is not biased against finding a
term premium in the yields on private money market
instruments.
EXPLAINING THE DIFFERENCE IN RESULTS
The above test for term premiums in the yields on The significant term premium in T-bill yields and
private money market instruments is subject to one the absence of significant term premiums in the
qualification. The test assumes that the degree of private money market yields suggests that the T-bill
default risk is the same for both maturities. The market differs in some way. The T-bill market does
assumption holds for T-bills since all maturities are differ in one important respect: whereas there are
essentially free of default risk. In contrast, each of many issuers in each of the private money markets,
the private money market instruments is subject to only the Treasury can issue T-bills. A key assump-
some risk of default, and different degrees of expected tion of the pure expectations theory is therefore vio-
default loss on three- and six-month private money lated in the T-bill market: market participants, in
market instruments could bias the test. In the general, cannot borrow at the T-bill rate. Because
Appendix, however, we show that under reasonable the rate at which participants in the T-bill market
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AVERAGE TERM PREMIUMS 1970 Q2 TO 1985 Q4
Commercial
T-bills CDs Eurodollars Paper
Average term premium 61 21 21 14
(in basis points)
Standard error 22 26 27 24
t-statistic 2.78 0.79 0.79 0.58
Number of observations 63 63 63 63
Notes:
(1) The term premium is the difference between the implied forward rate calculated from the
three- and six-month spot rates and the realized three-month spot rate three months later.
(2) The rates are for the first day of the third month of each quarter from Salomon Brothers, An
Analytical Record of Yields and Yield Spreads (New York, 1986). These rates are annualized
without compounding. Consequently, the formula used to calculate the forward rate is:
can borrow funds is higher than the T-bill rate, they
may be unable to profit from the difference between
the implied forward and expected future three-month
T-bill rates. Of course, the Treasury could reduce
the term premium by selling more three- and fewer
six-month T-bills, but it has not been willing to do so.
Additionally, the term premium in T-bill yields would
not exist unless some investors were willing to accept
a lower expected yield on three- than on six-month
T-bills. This section discusses these points in more
detail.
The Treasury’s Monopoly Limits Profit
Opportunities for Other Investors
The significant term premium in the implied for-
ward three-month T-bill rate indicates that investors
have been either unwilling or unable to take full
Table Ill
















Note: See notes in Table II.
advantage of the opportunity for expected profit
offered by the difference between implied forward
and expected future three-month T-bill rates. In-
vestors who were both willing and able would have
borrowed at the three-month T-bill rate and invested
in six-month T-bills for an expected profit. Such
transactions would have tended to push up the three-
month rate and push down the six-month rate. If
this element of the market was sufficiently large, the
implied forward three-month T-bill rate would have
been driven down close to the expected future three-
month T-bill rate, thereby eliminating the term
premium.
Investors may not be able to profit from the posi-
tive term premium in T-bill yields, however, because
the rate at which they can borrow three-month money
is higher than the three-month T-bill rate. In con-
trast, many participants in each of the markets for the
private money market instruments can profit from
any difference between implied forward and expected
future rates since they are able to both borrow and
lend at approximately equal rates. For example,
suppose a bank believes that the future three-month
Eurodollar rate will be lower than the forward Euro-
dollar rate implied by the yield curve. The bank can
issue a three-month Eurodollar deposit and place the
proceeds in a six-month Eurodollar deposit. The
bank will profit if the implied forward three-month
Eurodollar rate exceeds the realized future three-
month Eurodollar rate. Now consider a trader who
believes that the future three-month T-bill rate will
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implied by the yield curve. Since only the Treasury
can issue T-bills, the trader cannot raise three-month
funds at the three-month T-bill rate. Rather, if he
wishes to fund his purchase of a six-month T-bill by
borrowing for three months, his lowest cost source
of funds probably will be to enter into a repurchase
agreement (RP) with another party.
6 Under a re-
purchase agreement, funds are acquired through the
sale of a security coupled with a simultaneous agree-
ment to repurchase the security on a specified date
at an agreed upon price (and thus an agreed upon
rate of interest). For example, by buying a six-
month T-bill yielding 10 percent and entering into a
three-month repurchase agreement at 9 percent, the
trader can secure an investment in a three-month
T-bill commencing in three months yielding 11 per-
cent. If in three months the three-month T-bill rate
is less than 11 percent, he can sell the T-bill for a
profit.
Since the three-month RP rate is invariably higher
than the three-month T-bill rate, the forward rate
attainable by buying a six-month T-bill and financing
it with a three-month repurchase agreement is lower
than the forward rate implied by the three- and six-
month T-bill rates. Traders can expect to profit only
if this “attainable forward rate” is different from the
expected future T-bill rate.
7 The implied forward
T-bill rate can therefore be higher than the expected
future T-bill rate but not offer any profitable trades.
For example, if three-month T-bills are trading at
9 percent and six-month T-bills are trading at 10
percent, the implied forward rate on three-month
T-bills commencing in three months is 11 percent.
Suppose the expected future three-month T-bill rate
is 10.75 percent. If the three-month RP rate is 9.25
percent, the attainable forward three-month T-bill
rate is also 10.75 percent. Even though the expected
future three-month T-bill rate is less than the forward
rate implied by the T-bill yield curve, it is not less
than the attainable forward rate. Consequently, in-
vestors cannot profit from the gap between the im-
plied forward and expected T-bill rates.
6 Prior to the development of the RP market, the cheap-
est way for a trader to finance a six-month T-bill for
three months was to get a three-month loan from a bank
using the six-month T-bill as collateral.
7 The term “attainable forward rate” was introduced by
Gendreau (1983) in a study of the yields on Treasury bill
futures contracts.
Testing for Profit Opportunities
Because traders cannot borrow at the T-bill rate,
the positive term premium in T-bill yields does not
necessarily mean that they are passing up expected
profits. The appropriate test of whether traders have
passed up profit opportunities is whether the forward
rate attainable by purchasing a six-month T-bill and
financing it with a three-month repurchase agreement
has been significantly different from the realized
future three-month T-bill rate. Ideally, to carry out
this test the attainable forward rate should be calcu-
lated using the rate on RPs with six-month T-bills
posted as collateral. Unfortunately, data on the rates
on RPs with specific collateral are not available, but a
series on the 90-day RP rate on general government
securities collateral starting in September 1979 is
available through Data Resources, Inc. It is the
closest approximation available of the rate at which
traders can borrow three-month money using six-
month T-bills as collateral.
The average difference between the attainable
forward three-month T-bill rate (calculated from the
six-month T-bill and three-month RP rates) and the
three-month T-bill rate realized three months later
from September 1979 through December 1985 is
reported in Table IV. Since the average difference
between attainable forward rates and realized three-
month rates is only 4 basis points, there is no indica-
tion that traders passed up profit opportunities. For
comparison, the average term premium in the implied
forward three-month T-bill rate over the same period
(using the same method as in Table II) is 79 basis
points.
Table IV
ATTAINABLE FORWARD VS. REALIZED FUTURE
THREE-MONTH T-BILL RATES
1979 Q4 to 1985 Q4
Attainable Implied
Forward Rate Forward Rate
Less Realized Less Realized
Future Rate Future Rate
Average difference 4 79
(in basis points)
Standard error 50 51
t-statistic 0.09 1.55
Number of observations 25 25
Note: The rates are for the first day of the third month of each
quarter. T-bill rates are from Salomon Brothers, An Analytical
Record of Yields and Yield Spreads (New York, 1986). The
RP rates are from Data Resources, Inc.
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The positive term premium in the implied forward
three-month T-bill rate indicates that the Treasury
has been willing to issue six-month T-bills at a higher
expected interest cost than three-month T-bills. If
the Treasury were unwilling to pay a higher expected
yield on six-month T-bills, it could issue fewer six-
month and more three-month T-bills. Decreasing
the supply of six-month T-bills would tend to lower
the interest rate on them, and increasing the supply
of three-month T-bills would tend to raise their
interest rate. These actions would reduce, if not
eliminate, the term premium in the T-bill market.
The Treasury’s behavior is quite different from the
behavior of issuers in the private money markets, who
adjust the relative supplies of three- and six-month
instruments they issue in response to changes in
market rates and in their expectations of future
interest rates. The Treasury virtually always sells a
roughly equal amount of three- and six-month T-bills
at its weekly auction.
Because the rate on six-month T-bills is higher, on
average, than the rate on three-month T-bills, it
appears that the Treasury could lower its total financ-
ing costs by issuing fewer six-month and more three-
month T-bills. The potential cost savings from such a
change is hard to calculate, however, because it de-
pends on the responsiveness of three- and six-month
T-bill rates to changes in supplies-that is, on the
interest elasticities of the demands for three- and six-
month T-bills. In fact, such a change might not lower
the Treasury’s financing costs at all. If the Treasury
were to issue more three-month T-bills it would have
to pay a higher interest rate on all three-month
T-bills. If the demand for three-month T-bills were
less interest-elastic than the demand for six-month
T-bills, then the additional interest cost on three-
month T-bills could outweigh the savings from selling
fewer of the higher-cost six-month T-bills.
Even if the Treasury could reduce its financing
costs by issuing more three-month T-bills, it might
not be willing to do so because of other considera-
tions. For example, in recent years the Treasury
has been reducing the proportion of debt financed
with T-bills in order to increase the average maturity
of its debt outstanding. One reason for extending
the average maturity is to reduce the year-to-year
variation in the interest expense component of the
federal budget. Issuing more three- and fewer six-
month T-bills would conflict with the policy of debt
maturity extension.
The Demand for Short-Term T-Bills
The positive term premium in the implied forward
three-month T-bill rate also indicates that some in-
vestors have been willing to hold three-month T-bills
despite a lower expected return than on six-month
T-bills. Further, the absence of a term premium in
CD yields implies that investors who held three-
month T-bills could have expected higher returns
from holding three-month CDs even after adjusting
for the possibility of loss due to default on the CDs
8
These investors must have had preferences for three-
month T-bills over six-month T-bills and over three-
month CDs that made them willing to hold three-
month T-bills despite a lower expected return.
Broadly speaking there are two possible explana-
tions why some investors are willing to accept a
lower expected yield on three-month T-bills. The
first is that some investors may be risk averse. They
may be willing to accept lower expected returns
on three- than on six-month T-bills because six-
month T-bills are subject to greater fluctuation in
capital value, and they may be willing to accept lower
expected returns on three-month T-bills than on CDs
because CDs are subject to greater risk of default.
A second possibility is that some investors may be
willing to accept lower returns on three-month T-bills
because of special characteristics of T-bills. One such
characteristic is the role that T-bills play in satisfying
numerous institutional and regulatory requirements.
For example, Treasury securities are eligible pledging
assets against Treasury tax and loan accounts as well
as against most state and local government deposits.
T-bills are also widely accepted as collateral for
selling short various financial securities. T-bills can
be used instead of cash to satisfy initial margin re-
quirements against futures market positions. For
many of these purposes investors might prefer three-
to six-month T-bills because the benefit from holding
T-bills is expected to accrue for only a short time.
Such might be the case, for example, if T-bills were
held as collateral for volatile government deposits or
as margin for short-term futures contracts.
Another special characteristic of T-bills is that the
8 Assume that the annualized expected default loss on a
three-month CD is no greater than on a six-month CD.
Assume also that the expected yield on six-month T-bills
is no greater than the expected yield on six-month CDs.
Then the fact that the spread between the rates on three-
month CDs and three-month T-bills is greater than the
spread between the rates on six-month CDs and six-
month T-bills implies that the expected yield on three-
month T-bills is less than the expected yield on three-
month CDs.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND 9interest income on them is not subject to state and
local income taxes. Because of peculiarities in the tax
laws, most large investors, such as banks and corpor-
ations, nevertheless do have to pay taxes on T-bill
interest income.9 Hence, this tax advantage accrues
mainly to individual investors. If individuals have a
preference for liquidity that is not shared by large
investors, they may be willing to accept a lower yield
on three- than on six-month T-bills while large in-
vestors are not willing to accept a lower expected




Since traders in the T-bill market cannot borrow
funds at the T-bill rate, movements in the spread
between the rate at which they can borrow and the
T-bill rate may cause the term premium to vary over
time. Movements in the spread between the RP rate
and the T-bill rate change the spread between the
implied forward rate and the attainable forward rate.
If traders keep the attainable forward rate equal to
the expected future rate by maximizing expected
profits, such movements also change the spread be-
tween the implied forward rate and the expected
future rate, i.e., change the term premium.
An example helps demonstrate how movements in
the spread between the RP rate and the T-bill rate
can affect the term premium. Assume that the three-
month T-bill rate is 9.5 percent, the six-month T-bill
rate is 10 percent, and the three-month RP rate is
9.75 percent. Assume also that the expected future
three-month T-bill rate is 10.25 percent (equal to the
attainable forward rate). Since the implied forward
rate of 10.50 percent is 25 basis points higher than
the expected future rate, the term premium is 25 basis
points. Now, if the three-month T-bill rate falls
to 9.25 percent and other rates are unchanged, then
the implied forward rate rises to 10.75 percent.
The implied forward rate is now 50 basis points
higher than the expected future rate, but since the
attainable forward rate is still equal to the expected
future rate there are no profitable trading oppor-
tunities. In this case the term premium increased
from 25 to 50 basis points simply because of an in-
crease in the spread between the three-month RP rate
and the three-month T-bill rate.
9 Cook and Lawler (1983) provide details on the tax-
ation of T-bill interest income for different investors.
Movements in the spread between the three-month
RP rate and the three-month T-bill rate have been
substantial, as shown in Chart 2. These movements
may explain why some researchers have found evi-
dence of a time-varying term premium in the T-bill
market.
10
T-Bill Futures Rates and Implied
Forward Rates
The difference between the interest rate at which
private investors can borrow and the interest rate on
T-bills also helps explain why implied forward T-bill
rates have been higher than the rates on T-bill futures
contracts. If investors could both borrow and lend
at the T-bill rate, any significant difference between
implied forward rates and futures rates would offer
profitable arbitrage opportunities. Investors could
lock in a risk-free profit by borrowing money at the
three-month T-bill rate, investing in a six-month
T-bill and simultaneously entered into a futures
contract to sell a three-month T-bill three months in
the future. Private investors, however, cannot carry
out this set of transactions because they cannot bor-
row at the T-bill rate. As pointed out by Gendreau
(1985) the relevant rate comparison for arbitrage
opportunities is between the forward rate attainable
by investors through buying a T-bill and financing it
10 Researchers who have found a time-varying term
premium in the T-bill market include Kessel (1965),
Friedman (1979), and Jones and Roley (1983).
Chart 2
SPREAD BETWEEN THE
RP AND T-BILL RATES
Basis Points
80 81 82 83 84 85
Monthly Averages
Note: The spread is the difference between the
monthly average 90-day RP rate (from Data Re-
sources, Inc.) and the monthly average secondary
market 3-month T-bill rate (from the Federal
Reserve Bulletin) adjusted to an interest-to-follow
basis (see Chart 1 ).
10 ECONOMIC REVIEW, JULY/AUGUST 1986with a term RP and the rate on the corresponding
T-bill futures contract. Gendreau compared these
rates and found that the attainable forward three-
month T-bill rate was lower, on average, than the
futures rate and that the difference was statistically
insignificant.
CONCLUSIONS
The evidence presented in this article confirms the
conclusions of other studies that the pure expecta-
tions theory does not completely explain the term
structure of Treasury bill rates. There is strong evi-
dence of a positive average term premium in the
implied forward three-month T-bill rate. The be-
havior of the term structure of T-bill yields, however,
appears to be atypical of the money market in general.
Based on the evidence presented in this article, one
cannot reject the pure expectations theory as an
explanation of the term structure of private money
market yields. The difference in results suggests that
the T-bill market differs in some way from the private
money markets. In fact, a key assumption of the
pure expectations theory is violated in the T-bill
market because market participants in general cannot
borrow at the T-bill rate. They may therefore be
unable to profit from the positive term premium in
T-bill yields. Only the Treasury can issue T-bills
and it has been willing to pay a term premium to
issue six-month T-bills.
Thus, conclusions from studies of the term struc-
ture of T-bill yields should not be generalized to the
yields on private money market instruments. For
example, although investors in three-month T-bills
can expect higher returns on average from investing
in six-month T-bills, investors in three-month CDs
cannot necessarily expect higher returns from in-
vesting in six-month CDs. Finally, because the term
premium in T-bill yields may result from unique
characteristics of the T-bill market and the pure
expectations theory is consistent with the term struc-
tures of private money market yields, the pure expec-
tations theory appears to be consistent with the be-
havior of money market participants in general.
This Appendix describes the effect of default-risk
on the test for a term premium. It derives the rela-
tionship between the measured term premium based
on promised yields and the true term premium based
on expected yields, that is, yields that have been ad-
justed for expected default loss. We assume continu-
ously compounded rates of return, for which the
linear approximation of the implied forward rate is
exact.
The expected yield on a bond is equal to the



















t = annualized expected default loss on an
i-period bond.
Now, the measured implied forward rate on one-













and the measured term premium (MTPt) is the
difference between the measured implied forward rate








The true implied forward rate on one-period bonds
one period in the future observed at time t (TIFRt)








and the true term premium (TTP
1
t) is the difference
between the true implied forward rate and the ex-
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pected default loss on a two-period bond. The only
circumstance that would bias the test against finding a
term premium in, for example, CD yields would be a
probability of default on consecutive three-month
CDs that was higher than the probability of default
on a six-month CD. This notion seems quite im-
plausible when applied to the high-grade money
market instruments used in this study, and we know
The test is therefore not biased against finding a
positive term premium if the annualized expected
default loss on two consecutive one-period bonds is
less than or equal to two times the annualized ex-
of no empirical evidence to support it. There is
consequently no reason to believe that default risk
would bias the test against finding a term premium in
the yields on private money market instruments.
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